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Abstract This study provides evidence of the impact of membership of a 
microfinance institution (MFI) in Bangladesh on poverty alleviation. Using a 
 quasi-experimental approach with a control group the members of which had never 
been members of a MFI, interviews with members of a prominent Bangladesh 
MFI were conducted in relation to their material possessions. In almost every 
aspect of material well-being, including income, ownership of assets, savings 
and food intake, members of the MFI are significantly better off than non-mem-
bers when examined on a univariate basis. In multivariate tests, MFI membership 
is found to be associated with household income and, further, household wealth, 
measured in terms of savings, is associated with longer membership of a MFI.
Keywords Microfinance · Poverty alleviation · Economic development · 
Empowerment of women · Bangladesh · Well-being
2.1  Introduction
Poverty is a key issue in the development arena that has received significant 
 attention from various agencies due to its relevance to human welfare and 
 progress. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of membership of a 
microfinance program on poverty in Bangladesh at the household level. The study 
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provides evidence of the impact of microfinance institution (MFI) membership in 
terms of material outcomes and examines the influence of longer versus shorter 
MFI membership on these outcomes.
2.2  Poverty
Poverty in its most basic form can be defined as a deprivation of well-being and 
this has been the concern of policy makers and, more recently, of many non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Yet, poverty is not a problem that has eased 
with time. According to the United Nations Human Development Report, approxi-
mately 1.2 billion people worldwide earned only US$ 1 a day in 2000; 2.4 billion 
were without basic sanitation; 1 billion were illiterate; 100 million were homeless; 
and approximately 100 million children lived or worked on the streets (UNDP 
2000, p. 19; Globalissues.org 2009).
The ramifications of poverty extend far beyond just the problems associated 
with a lack of income. Individuals living in poverty ‘are particularly vulnerable 
to adverse events outside their control’ (Smith 1776); they often lack social rights 
and are excluded from society. Despite the long-standing presence of poverty 
throughout the world, it was not until the 1970s that issues associated with poverty 
came to the forefront of debate and policy formulation in the area of development 
economics (Fukuda-Parr and Kumar 2003).
In broad terms, poverty can be said to result from distributional issues includ-
ing unemployment, lack of income, lack of fulfillment of basic needs, landless-
ness, and unavailability of credit. It can be seen as the lack of means for the 
necessary expenditure enabling purchase of a minimum standard of living, for 
example, nutrition. This minimum standard varies from country to country. This 
notion reinforces the dynamic aspect of poverty as the ‘poverty line’ shifts with 
changes in the overall condition of the economy (Runciman 1962; Townsend 
1985). Thus, poverty is multidimensional. Moreover, poverty restricts one’s ability 
to participate in society.
The notion of deprivation is broader than the concept of poverty and is intrin-
sically multidimensional (Smith 1776; World Bank 2000). Deprivation has many 
forms, but what is common to all these forms is that deprivation restricts what 
Amartya Sen calls ‘the capabilities that a person has, that is, the substantive free-
dom he or she enjoys to lead the kind of life he or she values’ (Sen 1999, p. 87). 
This capability perspective further explains the notion of deprivation which Smith 
(1776) depicts as the inability ‘to appear in public without shame’ and which is 
directly related to the concept of social exclusion.
This paper presents evidence on the impact of membership of an MFI on mate-
rial outcomes. The study uses interview evidence gathered from 198 Bangladesh 
microfinance members, together with evidence from 97 control group members 
who had never joined an MFI program, to test whether membership enables alle-
viation from poverty. Using both univariate tests of comparison between MFI and 
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control group members and multivariate regression, evidence is found of higher 
income assets, savings, food intake, housing security and quality, and more 
income sources in the case of MFI members. Further, MFI members report better 
housing conditions as compared to non-members. Additionally, before and after 
MFI membership comparisons reveal significant improvement in material out-
comes associated with becoming an MFI member. However, no evidence is found 
that longer duration of MFI membership is significantly associated with improved 
material outcomes apart from savings.
2.3  Microfinance’s Role in Addressing Poverty
In recent years, numerous studies have noted the positive impact of microfinance 
on clients with regard to material well-being, reduction in exposure to seasonal 
vulnerability, contributions to consumption smoothing, and a better ability to 
deal with crises (Khalily 2004; Khandker 1998; Mustafa et al. 1996a, b; Pitt and 
Khandker 1998). However, few of these studies compare results with those not 
members of microfinance programs.
Microfinance has become an ‘inducer’ in many community development activi-
ties, and it is an ingredient in many larger programs, such as education and train-
ing, employment generation, empowerment of women, social responsiveness, and 
political awareness (ADB 2000; Alamgir 1997; Jahan 1991). It also promotes the 
growth of local enterprises and women entrepreneurs (Bertaux and Crable 2007; 
Morduch 1999; Pitt and Khandker 1998). Theoretically, these successes rely 
heavily on the conception that borrowers can make use of their social capital to 
overcome many problems associated with asymmetric information in credit mar-
kets, such as adverse selection, moral hazard, collateral and contract enforcement 
(Gomez and Santor 2001). Hossain’s (2002, p. 159) study in Bangladesh reveals 
the importance of various factors behind the improvement in economic condi-
tion and, thus, improvement in material condition and poverty alleviation among 
microfinance borrowers. In this study, about 60 % of borrowers believe that capital 
gained from a microfinance program primarily assisted them in achieving a better 
socioeconomic condition.
Grameen Bank’s (the pioneer of microfinance in Bangladesh) experiments and 
its success have led to wider acceptability of the notion that accesses to credit by 
the poor can bring about change in their socioeconomic situation (Khalily 2004; 
Simanowitz 2003). Hossain’s (2002, p. 159) evidence shows that membership in 
a microfinance program has a positive impact on borrowers’ perceptions of their 
income status.
Most studies on the impact of microfinance programs focus on poverty as 
measured by income alone (Alamgir 2000; Gomez and Santor 2001; Hietalahti 
and Linden 2006; Mosley and Hulme 1998; Shaw 2004), with a few studies exam-
ining two or more aspects of poverty concurrently (Berger 1989; Johnson 2005; 
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Khandker 1998; Rahman 2002; Zohir et al. 2001). In the context of the above dis-
cussion, the hypotheses tested in this study are as follows:
H1: Individuals involved in a microfinance program exhibit increased income as 
compared to those not involved.
H2: Individuals involved in a microfinance program for longer rather than shorter 
durations exhibit increased household wealth.
A major contribution of this paper is that it focuses on economic income and phys-
ical assets for MFI members as compared to non-members. As such, this study 
examines the issues from a wider perspective than most previous studies by look-
ing beyond income parameters. The next section discusses the research design and 
data-gathering procedures used in the study.
2.4  Research Design and Sample Selection
The study gathered data from MFI members who had been in a microfinance pro-
gram for at least two durations—4 and 8 years. The third group of respondents 
consisted of the control group1 made up of people who are not members of any 
microfinance program. Two structured interview guides for MFI members and 
non-members were used. In the questions for MFI members, responses provide 
data for two different time segments, first, for the ‘present’ status of members and, 
second, for their status ‘before they became a member of the MFI.’ Copies of the 
structured interview guides were evaluated and critiqued by a microfinance expert 
in UNDP, a senior academic in development studies from the University of 
Melbourne and executives from the Grameen Bank and BRAC in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh was chosen as the geographical area for this research due to the 
success of microfinance in this country in improving the socioeconomic status of 
the vast majority of poor people (Bhatt and Tang 2001; Hashemi 1996; Holcombe 
1995; Khandker 1998; Pitt and Khandker 1998). For the purpose of this study, the 
top 50 MFIs according to the Credit and Development Forum (CDF 2004) rank-
ing were selected. After a series of communications with potential respondents, 
a successful negotiation was made with the Association for Social Advancement 
(ASA). In selecting specific locations for interviews, random sampling was used 
and three (Gaibandha, Gazipur, and Kurigram) of 64 districts were selected. All 
names of prospective participants provided were for female members, since mem-
bers of the ASA are primarily women (99.99 %) (Chowdhury 2005).
1
 A second approach is the control group method which has been widely used. This requires a 
before and after comparison of a population that received a specific treatment (that is, a microfi-
nance program) and an identical population (or as close as possible) that did not receive the treat-
ment (Hulme 2000). This study uses a control group approach.
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In the first stage, a sample was selected from the three chosen districts accord-
ing to two categories: those with 4-year MFI membership (Group 1) and those 
with 8-year MFI membership (Group 2). Then, a random sampling technique was 
used to select 33 MFI members from each group. In this way, a total of 198 MFI 
members were selected for the interview process from the three districts (that is, 3 
districts × 2 groups × 33 MFI members). It was also agreed with the participating 
MFIs that if a selected member did not wish to participate, details for a replace-
ment MFI member would be provided.
In the second stage, we randomly approached one individual from each house-
hold, explained the project, and requested participation. Then, the potential partici-
pants were asked about their MFI membership status. People who had never been 
MFI members were interviewed (Group 3) until 99 agreed to participate, becom-
ing the control group. Thus, 99 respondents from each of the three chosen districts 
(Groups 1, 2, and 3) participated to make up a total of 297 respondents.
The econometric tools used with the data to test the hypotheses include univari-
ate tests of difference between the treatment and control groups, correlations and 
multivariate tests involving OLS regression.
2.5  Results: Microfinance and Poverty Alleviation
Income is the foremost determinant of the economic situation of individuals. 
Table 2.1 presents the monthly income earned by the interviewees divided into 
eleven ranges. The minimum income range is set as 500–999 taka and the maxi-
mum as 5,500 taka and above. The table provides percentages and the number of 
Table 2.1  Total amount of monthly income (taka)
aAmounts in Bangladeshi taka (1 AUD = 56 taka at the time of interviews)









4 and 8 years 
(N = 198)
4 years (N = 99) 8 years (N = 99)
Before After Before After
500–2,999 58 % 
(n = 57)






















2,586 4,326 2,131 4,116 2,552 4,535
t test −9.704 −14.466 −16.269
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respondents in each income range. On average, MFI members earn 4,326 taka, 1.7 
times more than ‘control’ group members (2,586 taka). MFI members achieve sig-
nificantly higher income than control group respondents (t = −9.704, p < 0.01).
Moreover, MFI members from both groups (4 and 8 year) achieve a signifi-
cant improvement after joining the program. Table 2.2 shows the average income 
of both the groups almost doubled over the membership period, increasing from 
2,131 to 4,116 taka for the ‘4-year’ group, and from 2,551 to 4,535 taka for the 
‘8-year’ group. If 2,500–2,999 taka is taken as a reference point, 58 % of the con-
trol group members have income within this low range, whereas this is so for only 
13 % of MFI members (16 % of ‘4-year’ and 10 % of ‘8-year’ groups). T tests 
reveal a significant difference (−14.466, p < 0.01) between the ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
membership period. Income is also significantly (−16.269, p < 0.01) different in 
the ‘before’ and ‘after’ 8 years of membership. No association is found between 
membership duration and total monthly income.
Table 2.2 reveals that 79 % of MFI members have a second source of income as 
compared to only 24 % of the control group respondents. This difference is signifi-
cant (Chi2 = 82.246, p < 0.01). Moreover, 23 % of MFI members report having a 
third income source as compared to 2 % of the control group. This difference is also 
significant (Chi2 = 21.917, p < 0.01). Lastly, although 3 % of MFI members have a 
fourth income source, none of the control group members does, but this difference 
is not statistically significant. Of the members from the 4-year group, 86 % have a 
second source of income as compared to 71 % of respondents from the 8-year group 
and this difference is also significant (Chi2 = 5.923, p < 0.05). As the general nature 
of poverty in rural Bangladesh is chronic and seasonal, having multiple sources of 
income can better equip the rural poor to fight poverty. Thus, Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show 
that MFI members have an economic advantage over the control group respondents.
Table 2.2  Number of income sources
Income source Non-MFI 
members Control 
group (N = 99)
MFI members






Number 1 100 % (n = 99) 100 % (n = 198) 100 % (n = 99) 100 % (n = 99)




p value 0.000 0.015




p value 0.000 0.736




p value 0.111 0.652
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Expenditure determines one’s capacity to acquire necessities and, more specifi-
cally, for respondents to meet their basic needs and live a decent life. Table 2.4 
shows that MFI members spend more each month compared to control group 
respondents. For example, in the highest expenditure category (5,500 taka and 
above), 16 % of MFI members are recorded as compared to only 4 % of control 
group respondents. Likewise, in the same expenditure category, MFI members 
from both the 4- and 8-year groups spend more after joining the microfinance 
program than before. It can also be inferred that after joining an MFI, members’ 
Table 2.3  Total amount of monthly expenditure










4 and 8 years 
(N = 198)
4 years (N = 99) 8 years (N = 99)
Before After Before After
500–999 7 % (n = 7) 0 3 % (n = 3) 0 2 % (n = 2) 0
1,000–1,499 15 % 
(n = 15)
1 % (n = 1) 15 % 
(n = 15)
0 8 % (n = 8) 1 % (n = 1)
1,500–1,999 14 % 
(n = 14)
6 % (n = 12) 19 % 
(n = 19)
9 % (n = 9) 19 % 
(n = 19)
3 % (n = 3)
2,000–2,499 18 % 
(n = 18)
7 % (n = 13) 24 % 
(n = 24)
6 % (n = 6) 18 % 
(n = 18)
7 % (n = 7)




9 % (n = 9) 17 % 
(n = 17)
9 % (n = 9) 3 % (n = 3)












3,500–3,999 4 % (n = 4) 9 % (n = 18) 3 % (n = 3) 7 % (n = 7) 2 % (n = 2) 11 % 
(n = 11)
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income increases (revealed in Table 2.2) and this makes it possible for them to 
spend more. It is also apparent that, on average, the monthly expenditure of 
MFI members (3,715 taka) is 1.6 times more than that of the ‘control’ group 
(2,389 taka). This difference is significant (t = −8.000, p < 0.01).
Table 2.3 reveals that the average monthly expenditure of the ‘4-year’ group 
increased from 2,237 taka before joining to 3,455 taka after, while the ‘8-year’ 
group reported an increase from 2,586 taka before to 3,975 taka after. If 2,500–
2,999 taka is taken as a reference point, the monthly expenditure of 67 % of 
respondents from the control group falls within this low range, whereas this is 
the case for only 23 % of MFI members (32 % of the ‘4-year’ group and 14 % 
of the ‘8-year’ group fall in the same low range). T tests for monthly expendi-
ture between ‘before’ and ‘after’ joining, in both the ‘4-year’ and ‘8-year’ groups, 
are significant (t = −13.860, p < 0.01 and t = −15.321, p < 0.01, respectively). 
However, there is no significant difference (t = −1.672, p > 0.05) between mem-
bership duration and monthly expenditure.
Savings are an important asset that provides financial security in response to 
shocks. Compulsory savings schemes are practiced by most MFIs, including ASA. 
Table 2.4 shows savings reported by participants, divided into twelve ranges. The 
minimum savings range is set as 1–999 taka and the maximum 11,000 taka and 
above.
Table 2.4  Total amount of household savings
aAmounts in Bangladeshi taka (1 AUD = 56 taka at the time of the interviews)
Total amount of 
savingsa
Non-MFI members MFI Members
Control group 
(N = 99)
4 and 8 years 
(N = 198)
4 years (N = 99) 8 years 
(N = 99)
No savings 70 % (n = 69) – – –
1–999 12 % (n = 12) 13 % (n = 25) 14 % (n = 14) 11 % (n = 11)
1,000–1,999 6 % (n = 6) 30 % (n = 59) 34 % (n = 34) 25 % (n = 25)
2,000–2,999 3 % (n = 3) 20 % (n = 40) 20 % (n = 20) 20 % (n = 20)
3,000–3,999 1 % (n = 1) 6 % (n = 12) 6 % (n = 6) 6 % (n = 6)
4,000–4,999 – 3 % (n = 6) 2 % (n = 2) 4 % (n = 4)
5,000–5,999 1 % (n = 1) 9 % (n = 18) 11 % (n = 11) 7 % (n = 7)
6,000–6,999 – 2 % (n = 3) – 3 % (n = 3)
7,000–7,999 – 2 % (n = 3) 1 % (n = 1) 2 % (n = 2)
8,000–8,999 – 1 % (n = 2) – 2 % (n = 2)
9,000–9,999 – – – –
10,000–10,999 2 % (n = 2) 4 % (n = 9) 4 % (n = 4) 5 % (n = 5)
11,000 and above 5 % (n = 5) 11 % (n = 21) 7 % (n = 7) 14 % (n = 14)
Average savings 
(taka)
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Table 2.4 shows that MFI members achieve higher savings than control group 
respondents, as 70 % of respondents from the control group have no savings as 
compared to MFI members, each of whom has at least some savings. It is also 
revealed that, on average, respondents from the ‘8-year’ group have the highest 
savings (3,899 taka), followed by the ‘4-year’ (2,818 taka) and control groups with 
an average of 960 taka. This is a significant difference (t = −7.791, p < 0.01). 
Savings is also significantly different (t = 2.170, p < 0.05) between the 4- and 
8-year MFI member groups. Interestingly, in the highest range (11,000 taka and 
above), the ‘8-year’ group numbers are almost double the ‘4-year’ group. 
Membership duration does appear to have a significant impact on the level of sav-
ings achieved by MFI members, but whether this is because of compulsory savings 
cannot be discerned.
Table 2.5 shows the Pearson’s correlations between MFI members’ total loans 
and their total monthly income, expenditure, and household savings. There are sig-
nificant positive correlations between loan amounts and other indicators of pov-
erty. The Pearson’s r between loans and income is 0.482; it is 0.352 between loans 
and expenditure; and 0.359 between loans and savings. Not unexpectedly, the 
highest correlation is between income and expenditure at 0.778.
Housing arrangements are an important determinant of economic status. 
Table 2.6 shows housing arrangements for all respondents.
The data reveal that 97 % of MFI members own the property they live in 
as compared to 36 % of control group respondents, a difference which is sig-
nificant (Chi2 = 135.927, p < 0.01). However, house ownership for 4- and 8-year 
MFI members is not significantly different. Nineteen percentage of control group 
respondents rent their houses. Conversely, no MFI members rent their houses after 
joining the program and this difference is also significant (Chi2 = 40.597, p < 0.01). 
Table 2.6 shows that 23 % of control group respondents live on land which they do 
not own or rent, but use for free, compared to only 2 % of MFI members, a differ-
ence which is significant (Chi2 = 35.933, p < 0.01). Likewise, a higher percentage 
(21 %) of control group members live in squatters compared to only 1 % of MFI 
members, a difference which is significant (Chi2 = 37.702, p < 0.01).
Table 2.7 reveals materials used in the construction of respondents’ houses.
MFI member and non-member respondents report similar flooring materials. 
However, an improvement in flooring materials is recorded after MFI membership 
compared to before for both the 4- and 8-year groups (Chi2 = 75.326, p < 0.01; 
Table 2.5  Pearson’s correlations: member’s total loans, income, and expenditure
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)









Total monthly income 0.380(**) 0.778(**)
Total amount of loans 
received
0.359(**) 0.352(**) 0.482(**)
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Chi2 = 25.402, p < 0.01). However, there is no significant difference in the type of 
flooring material used by people with different durations of MFI membership. Of 
the roofing materials listed in Table 2.9, ‘straw’ is the most vulnerable and unsta-
ble, while tin and brick (concrete) are more stable. The vulnerability of housing 
materials used is closely linked to economic situation, and investigating this issue 
in the context of Bangladesh helps evaluate the relationship between MFI mem-
bership and housing quality.
Table 2.7 shows that roofing type is significantly different between MFI mem-
bers and non-members, with the difference being significant (Chi2 = 9.670, 
p < 0.01). After joining the microfinance program, more than 27 % of respond-
ents from both the 4- and 8-year groups were able to improve the condition of 
their roofs and avoid using straw. An additional 23 % in the ‘4-year’ group and 
24 % in the ‘8-year’ group use tin in the ‘after’ category compared to ‘before.’ This 
is a significant difference for the ‘4-year’ (Chi2 = 24.057, p < 0.01) and ‘8-year’ 
(Chi2 = 23.689, p < 0.01) groups. However, there is no significant difference 
found for the duration of membership.
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The last section of Table 2.7 indicates the materials used by respondents in 
the walls of their houses. Compared to the control group, a greater proportion 
of MFI members use superior, more durable materials. The major differences 
are recorded between using straw and tin. Only 6 % of MFI members use straw 
as compared to 46 % of respondents from the control group. Of MFI members, 







4 and 8 years 
(N = 198)
4 years (N = 99) 8 years (N = 99)
Before After Before After
Floor Brick 10 % 
(n = 10)




5 % (n = 5) 17 % 
(n = 17)





















Effect of membership dura-
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(n = 14)
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(n = 5)
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(n = 14)
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(n = 5)
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68 % use tin as compared to 43 % of the control group. This difference is sig-
nificant (Chi2 = 69.947, p < 0.01). Moreover, improvement in wall condition is 
recorded after MFI membership begins in both the 4- and 8-year groups. The 
‘before’ and ‘after’ joining for the ‘4-year’ group is significantly different in terms 
of wall material (Chi2 = 120.317, p < 0.01) and similarly for the ‘8-year’ group 
(Chi2 = 74.263, p < 0.01). However, there is no significant difference between 
MFI membership duration groups.
Ownership of land is an important determinant of economic situation and is valu-
able in providing financial security as well as a source of earnings. Table 2.8 shows 
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that 17 % of control group respondents own land compared to 52 % of MFI mem-
bers. Three percentage of control group respondents own 2.51 acres of land or above 
as compared to only 1 % of MFI members. The table shows that, on average, MFI 
members own double the land area compared to control group respondents (0.33 acres 
compared with 0.16 acres), a difference that is significant (t test = −3.358, p < 0.01).
MFI members in both 4- and 8-year groups acquired more land after they 
joined the microfinance program. The average land area owned by both groups 
increased (from 0.18 to 0.31 acres and 0.22 to 0.35 acres, respectively). These 
differences are significant (t test = 6.449, p < 0.01 and t test = 7.404, p < 0.01). 
However, there is no significant difference between membership duration and land 
area owned by MFI members.
Table 2.9 arguably captures the very nature of poverty and its effects on human 
beings. It reveals the frequency of daily food intake reported by the respond-
ents. The table shows that 39 % of control group respondents have three meals 
per day compared to 96 % of MFI members. On average, control group respond-
ents have 2.38 meals per day or just over 7 meals every three days, whereas MFI 
members have less than three (2.95) meals daily. This difference is significant 
(Chi2 = 121.111, p < 0.01). The table also shows a significant improvement in 
food intake by the 4- and 8-year groups after joining the microfinance program 
(Chi2 = 25.918, p < 0.01 and Chi2 = 46.867, p < 0.01, respectively). However, 
there is no significant relationship between duration of MFI membership and fre-
quency of daily food intake.









4 and 8 years 
(N = 198)
4 years (N = 99) 8 years (N = 99)
Before After Before After
Once 1 % 
(n = 1)
1 % (n = 1) 5 % 
(n = 5)
0 10 % 
(n = 10)
1 % (n = 1)
Twice 60 % 
(n = 59)
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Overall, these findings support the hypothesis of association between MFI 
membership and poverty alleviation. Table 2.9 shows that MFI members are far 
better off than non-MFI members in terms of their frequency of daily food intake.
2.5.1  Linear Regression Model 1
Table 2.10 presents a linear regression model with the difference in monthly 
income after joining the MFI compared to that before joining the MFI 
Table 2.10  OLS linear regression model on ‘income difference’ (N = 297)
Legend
Household size Household size (number of people within respondent’s household)
MFIMembership Membership of a MFI (1 if respondent is a member, 0 = otherwise)
Mainhhincome Main source of household income (1 if agricultural, 0 otherwise)
LandBalance Ownership of land (in area) by respondent household
MobileBalance Ownership of mobile phone(s) by respondent household
RadioBalance Ownership of radio by the respondent household
Kurigram Program area (1 if respondent is a resident in relevant area, 0 otherwise)
foodprobD1 Duration in months of first annual incidence of difficulty in accessing food
foodprobD2 Duration in months of second annual incidence of difficulty in accessing food
houseOwnedYN Status of housing arrangements (1 if respondent own the house, 0 otherwise)
Roof after Condition of roof of respondent’s house
Floor after Condition of floor of respondent’s house
Wall after Condition of wall of respondent’s house
Dependent variable = ‘current income’ Standardized coefficients t Sig.
Beta Std. error
(Constant) 0.066 794.155 −1.281 0.201
Household size 0.520 63.588 1.478 0.140
MFIMembership 0.120 295.878 8.066 0.000
Mainhhincome 0.108 18.908 2.620 0.009
LandBalance 0.207 332.104 2.433 0.016
MobileBalance 0.068 377.233 4.466 0.000
RadioBalance −0.062 246.696 1.425 0.155
Kurigram −0.041 207.557 −1.368 0.172
foodprobD1 −0.020 30.792 −0.919 0.359
foodprobD2 −0.014 75.104 −0.424 0.672
houseOwnedYN 0.012 315.204 −0.231 0.817
Roof after 0.082 296.791 0.250 0.803
Floor after 0.029 341.416 1.598 0.111
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(‘incomedifference’) as the dependent variable. For the control group, the income 
difference is the amount of their present income. This model analyzes the rela-
tionship between many of the indicators of asset possession and quality of life, as 
posited in the earlier section. The table presents the linear regression results from 
regressing various socioeconomic variables with difference of monthly income in 
different periods of time. In this analysis, the full sample that includes interview-
ees from all groups (N = 297) is used.
The model has an adjusted R2 of 45.8 %, with an F statistic of 20.221 
(p < 0.001). The average variance inflation factor (VIF) of 1.35 shows that mul-
ticollinearity is not at a problematic level. As predicted, MFI membership is 
significant (p < 0.001) and positively associated with the dependent variable 
(incomedifference), which represents the difference in monthly income after com-
pared with ‘before’ for MFI members and the current income for non-members. 
Hence, H1 is supported. Other significant variables include main household 
income attributable to agriculture (Mainhhincom) (p < 0.01), respondent’s owner-
ship of land (p < 0.02) and mobile phone(s) (p < 0.001).
The household size; ownership of radio; the program area (Kurigram); diffi-
culty in accessing food in duration 1 (probfoodD1) and duration 2 (probfoodD2); 
respondent’s status on house ownership (houseOwnedYN); and the qual-
ity of roof, floor, and wall of the house in which the respondent resides are not 
significant.
2.5.2  Linear Regression Model 2
Table 2.11 presents a linear regression model with square root of current savings 
by the respondents with ‘Sqrtsavings’ as the dependent variable. This variable 
represents the square root of the total amount of household savings. The variable 
is transformed so that regression assumptions are complied with more closely. 
This model analyzes the relationship between various socioeconomic variables 
that represent possession of assets and quality of life indicators as posited in the 
earlier section. However, this time the sample is restricted to only MFI members 
(n = 198) and the hypothesis variable distinguishes between 4- and 8-year dura-
tion memberships.
In this case, savings is used as the dependent variable as it is impossible to 
expect respondents to correctly recall their actual monthly income 4 or 8 years 
prior to joining the MFI program. Besides, current savings is an effective measure 
of asset accumulation. The model has an adjusted R2 of 20.3 %, with an F statistic 
of 4.138 (p < 0.001). The average VIF of 1.18 shows that multicollinearity is not 
at a problematic level. Table 2.11 shows that the hypothesis variable, membership 
duration, is significant (p < 0.05) and, hence, there is a positive association with 
the dependent variable (‘Sqrtsaving’). Thus, longer rather than shorter MFI mem-
bership is associated with household wealth through the level of savings and H2 is 
supported.
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Table 2.11  Linear regression model on ‘Sqrt savings’ (N = 198)
Legend
Household size Household size (number of people within the respondents’ household)
MFIMembership Membership duration in MFI (1 = if respondent has been a member for 
8 years, 0 = if respondent has been a member for 4 years)
Household size Household size (number of people within the respondents’ household)
Mainhhincome Main source of household income (1 if agricultural, 0 otherwise)
Expensifees Reason for not consulting doctor in case of household sickness
Highestedu Respondent’s highest educational attainment
Wall after Condition of wall of respondent’s house
Roof after Condition of roof of respondent’s house
Toiletathome Condition of toilet facility at respondent’s home
Fridgeownedafter Ownership of fridge by the respondent’s household
Mobileownedafter Ownership of mobile phone(s) by the respondent’s household
Duckownedafter Ownership of duck by the respondent’s household
Goatownedafter Ownership of goat(s) by the respondent’s household
Cowownedafter Ownership of cow by the respondent’s household
Kurigram Program area (1 if respondent is a resident in relevant area, 0 otherwise)
foodprobD1 Duration in months of first annual incidence of difficulty in accessing food
foodprobD2 Duration in months of second annual incidence of difficulty in accessing food
Dependent variable = ‘Sqrt saving’ Standardized coefficients t Sig.
Beta Std. error
(Constant) 25.905 2.731 0.007
Kurigram −0.062 6.604 −0.887 0.376
Memduration 0.132 5.910 2.007 0.046
Household size −0.076 2.063 −1.136 0.257
Mainhhincome 0.146 0.548 2.161 0.032
Expensifees −0.143 7.709 −2.117 0.036
Highestedu −0.113 0.943 −1.560 0.120
Wall after 0.080 3.881 1.131 0.260
Roof after −0.078 9.835 −1.147 0.253
Toiletathome 0.077 7.447 1.063 0.289
Fridgeownedafter 0.150 20.221 2.122 0.035
Mobileownedafter 0.160 10.285 2.179 0.031
Duckownedafter 0.087 3.444 1.300 0.195
Goatownedafter 0.082 2.420 1.231 0.220
Cowownedafter 0.076 2.040 1.113 0.267
foodprobD1 −0.116 1.440 −1.637 0.103
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Among the other variables tested, as expected, the main source of house-
hold income being agricultural (Mainhhincome) is positively associated 
(p < 0.005), while ownership of fridge (Fridgeownedafter) and mobile phone 
(Mobileownedafter) by the respondents is found positively significant (p < 0.005). 
The expensiveness of medicines as a reason not to seek medical treatment 
(Expensifees) is negatively associated with ‘Sqrtsavings’ (p < 0.005). The pro-
gram area (Kurigram) in which the respondent resides, household size, highest 
educational attainment, construction materials used to build the wall and roof of 
the respondent’s residence, status of toilet at home, ownership of livestock (duck, 
goat, and cow) and the durations of difficulty in accessing food (foodprobD1) and 
(foodprobD2) are not significant.
2.6  Conclusions, Limitations, and Further Research
Countries across the developing and developed world are increasingly supporting 
microfinance in playing an active role in development initiatives. This study ana-
lyzes this role, and its findings further support and rationalize the need for micro-
finance programs in both the developed and developing world. Overwhelmingly, 
the tests of difference in this study show that income and asset possession by 
MFI members is significantly higher than for the ‘control’ or non-member group. 
However, in testing for shorter versus longer MFI membership effects, no signifi-
cant difference was revealed. Only household savings and the presence of a second 
income source were found to be linked to the duration of membership.
Overall, MFI members are revealed as economically better off than control 
group respondents in many aspects, including income, savings, housing arrange-
ments and quality, assets owned, and frequency of food intake. These findings 
support those of other research undertaken in different countries, e.g., Thailand 
(Coleman 2006), Philippines (Habib et al. 2006), Bangladesh (Husain 1998), and 
Malawi (Zeller et al. 1998). Consistent with Khandker (1998), membership dura-
tion is found to be associated with household wealth. The public policy implica-
tions of these findings reinforce the value of microfinance programs as a means of 
poverty alleviation. The findings contribute to many studies that demonstrate the 
effectiveness of this form of financing of microenterprises as a tool to fight poverty.
There are at least three potential drawbacks of impact studies like this: ‘pos-
sible selection bias,’ ‘endogeneity of program placement,’ and ‘fungibility of fund’ 
(Coleman 2006; Hulme 2000; Khalily 2004). First, in terms of potential selection 
bias, individuals participating in microfinance programs have their own personal 
and family characteristics (Khalily 2004) and these factors also play a key role 
in determining program participation. Hulme (2000, p. 85) mentions five possible 
sources of ‘selection bias’: (a) difficulty in finding a location with the same socio-
economic characteristics in both treatment and control groups; (b) difference in 
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‘invisible’ attributes (entrepreneurial drive and ability) among treatment and con-
trol groups; (c) any intervention that may result in a short-term positive response 
from the treatment group (Hawthorne effect); (d) the control group becoming con-
taminated by contact with the treatment group; and (e) ‘fungibility’ of the treat-
ment group (e.g., credit is transferred or loans are misused).
A number of studies (Chen and Dunn 1996; Coleman 1999; Dunn and 
Arbuckle 2001; Hashemi et al. 1996; Mustafa et al. 1996b; Pitt and Khandker 
1996) use a quasi-experimental design to estimate the effect of microfinance on 
participants. This study makes use of a control group to compare various aspects 
of the socioeconomic lives of MFI members with non-members. This approach 
helps minimize the effect of ‘selection bias.’
Hulme (2000) also argues that careful selection of a control group that is 
far away from the treatment group can tackle the problem of location. But as 
Bangladesh is a densely populated country, with a microfinance operation in virtu-
ally every district, it was not possible to avoid the selection problem entirely and 
source control group respondents far from MFI members. However, the problem 
of contamination of the control group (d) can be addressed by an approach such as 
‘client-to-be’ (Hulme and Mosley 1996), a strategy this study adopted as the con-
trol group population had never been members of any MFI but had the potential to 
be clients of a MFI.
Second, in terms of the endogeneity of program placement, MFIs usually 
place their programs and branches in accessible areas with better infrastructural 
development (Khandker et al. 1995). Thus, the extent of the program impact also 
depends on program placement. However, Khalily (2004) suggests that this endo-
geneity has very little or no impact on those studies that identify socioeconomic, 
political, and environmental factors in assessing program impact at the household 
level. This study minimizes the ‘endogeneity of program placement’ by assessing 
the program’s impact at the household level only.
Third, in terms of the issue of fungibility of credit, this is a critical problem in 
precisely determining the impact of credit (Adams et al. 1984; David and Meyer 
1983; Pischke et al. 1983). This arises from an inability to distinguish the uses of 
microcredit and other funds between households and enterprises. No studies have 
successfully controlled for fungibility.
Overwhelmingly, evidence presented by this study is consistent with MFIs hav-
ing made a substantial contribution to the overall improvement in the living stand-
ards and poverty situation of respondent MFI members as compared to control 
group members. But control for macroeconomic conditions or other exogenous 
variables such as market conditions and environmental conditions did not occur, 
and these are likely to affect microenterprise performance.
There are many areas for future research on exploring the linkages between 
MFIs and poverty alleviation: the impact of MFI membership on individuals over 
time, possible spillover effects arising from average neighborhood characteristics 
(using a larger sample size), other MFIs working in Bangladesh and comparing 
their impact on a larger scale, the experience of other countries and a cross- 
country comparison of MFIs’ association with poverty alleviation.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction 
in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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